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Abstract
This paper aims to fill the gap on the analysis of risksharing channels at the mi-
cro level, both within and across households. Using data from the Bank of Italy’s
Survey on Household Income and Wealth covering the financial crisis, we are able
to quantify in a unified and consistent framework several risksharing mechanisms
that so far have been documented separately. We find that Italian households were
able to smooth at least 78% of shocks to household head’s non-financial income
(labelled “basic income”) in 2008-2010, a fraction rising to 80% in 2010-2012. The
most important smoothing mechanism turns out to be within-household riskshar-
ing, which is able to absorb about half of a shock; but an analysis by net wealth
discloses striking differences in within-household risksharing between “poor” and
“rich” households. Self-insurance through saving/dissaving is also notable, as it
cushions 28% of changes in basic income in 2008-2010, and 24% in 2010-2012.
Interestingly, risksharing through portfolio diversification and private transfers
is rather limited, but the overall degree of shock absorption occurring through
private risksharing channels reaches 70%, as opposed to a meager 7% of a shock
cushioned by public transfers and taxes.
JEL classification: D31, C31.
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“...[T]he only way to obtain such
measures [of income and
consumption] is by imposing an
accounting framework on the
data, and painstakingly
constructing estimates from
myriad responses to questions
about the specific components
that contribute to the total.”
Angus Deaton (1997)
1. Introduction
Households lie at the center of economic analysis, as they are the core unit of
several decision-making processes and perform many economically relevant roles.
In fact, there is a large literature focusing on the many roles that households play,
both through market transactions (purchases of goods and services, supply of la-
bor and capital services, management of home productions) and via non-market
interactions (mutual assistance). Many of these activities are aimed at sharing
risk both among household members and across households.
In fact, the idea that marriage produces some kind of risk sharing among its
constituents has surfaced many times in the literature. Since Becker’s contri-
butions (1973, 1974)[10, 11], households economics has many times stressed the
idea that marriage fosters risk sharing. The underlying idea is that transfers
between spouses do achieve some smoothing in individual income streams’ vari-
ability. Some authors (for example, Chami and Hess, 2005[20]) have gone as far
as to suggest that individuals also marry in order to secure some hedging against
macroeconomic risks. A bunch of applied studies (which most frequently employ
micro data) provide some support to the idea that marriage achieves a certain
amount of risk sharing (as, for example, in the contributions by Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 1985[65], 1994[64]; Rosenzweig, 1988[62]; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989[63],
and others).
There is, however, another subtle way that marriage may influence risk sharing,
as it may be the case that more risk sharing comes at the expense of saving, as
long as people feel more secure in their spousal agreement (as suggested, for ex-
ample, by Devereux and Smith 1994[29]). This might decrease the buffer stock
from which consumption shocks get smoothed, by the saving/dissaving channel.
As for risksharing across households, suffice it to note that the modern theory
of risksharing has been developed centering on the household (or the individual)
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as its basic decision unit, entering transactions in the market (Arrow 1964[3],
Townsend 1994[69]; see Huang and Litzenberger 1988[43] or Deaton 1992[24] for
a systematization).
Yet despite the pivotal role that household risksharing plays in basic economic
agents’ decisions, very little empirical research has been devoted to the identifi-
cation and measurement of the mechanisms through which households cope with
the risk of income shocks, both between and within them. To be sure, initial em-
pirical tests of risksharing were carried out at the micro level (Cochrane, 1991[21];
Mace, 1991[53]; Nelson 1994[56]; Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff 1996[41]; Attana-
sio and Davis 1996[5], Declich and Ventura 2000[26]; Grande and Ventura 2002[37];
Krueger and Perri 2005[49], 2011[50]; Gervais and Klein 2010[36]); however these
studies could only test whether the null hypothesis of full risksharing was rejected
or not, without being able to identify or measure the economic mechanisms at
work. This is all the more unsatisfactory when one considers that theoretical
models predicting partial risksharing have been put forward.1 On the other hand,
the macro literature on international risksharing - whose theoretical underpinning
is typically a representative-agent extension of the basic micro framework - has
proceeded much further in the empirical analysis of risksharing channels. After
the first regression tests2 of full risksharing (Canova and Ravn 1996)[15], a vast
body of literature has developed, starting with Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha
(1996)[4], henceforth ASY (1996), with the aim to measure the extent of riskshar-
ing channels across countries (or regions) within a unified framework. In sum,
as Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)[12] point out, beside household saving
and borrowing, there is scattered evidence on the role played by various partial
insurance mechanisms on household consumption.
This paper aims to fill the gap on the analysis of risksharing channels at the
micro level, both within and across households. Using data from the Bank of
Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) in 2008-2012, we regress
consecutive household income measures (from household non-financial income to
household income, to household disposable income) on household head’s non-
financial income. By doing so, we are able to quantify in a unified and consistent
framework risksharing mechanisms that so far have been documented separately.
A well-known mechanism is portfolio diversification, which can be implemented
1Incomplete risksharing may arise due to exogenous factors, such as market incompleteness
and transaction costs, or endogenous factors, such as limited commitment or enforceability (see
Kehoe and Levine 1993[47], further developed by Kocherlakota 1996, Alvarez and Jermann
2000[2], Krueger and Uhlig 2006[48], Krueger and Perri 2011a[51]) and moral hazard.
2Tests of risksharing have also used correlation analysis to identify cross-country or cross-
regional risksharing. Examples of this strand of the literature include Backus, Kehoe, and
Kydland (1992)[8]), Pakko (1997)[58], Hess and Shin (1998)[42] and many others.
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through complete markets for contingent claims or appropriate more parsimo-
nious (and realistic) financial structures. Its role has been studied and quantified
by Arrow (1964)[3], (1996) and Townsend (1994)[69], among others.3 Another
classical risksharing channel consists of fiscal transfer/tax mechanisms.4 This has
been introduced by Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992)[66] and von Hagen (1992)[70].
Dynarski and Gruber (1997)[31] study the smoothing effect on US household
consumption of government transfers (including retirement income) and taxes
separately. For Italy, Dedola, Usai and Vannini (1999)[28], Me´litz and Zumer
(1999)[54] and Decressin (2002)[27] carry out analyses of public risksharing, but
at a macro level. An important - albeit less studied - channel of consumption
smoothing is intra-household risksharing, that is the smoothing of the house-
hold head’s income shocks through other members’ income changes. Hayashi,
Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996)[41] and Dynarski and Gruber (1997) quantify the
role of “wife’s earnings”, finding little effects. On the contrary, Garc´ıa-Escribano
(2004)[33] models risksharing within families explicitly, obtaining the opposite re-
sult. Informal risksharing between households - through private gifts, transfers,
aid and services - has been extensively studied in developing economies, but rarely
quantified in Western countries, at least in the way we do in our empirical anal-
ysis. Finally, household self-insurance through asset accumulation and depletion
(lending and borrowing in credit markets) has received the most attention, as it
stems from the literature on permanent income/life cycle behavior. While the
basic idea of our paper consists in applying the ASY methodology to households
instead of countries, a mere carry-over of the ASY (1996) SUR estimation to a
micro setting would be problematic. Indeed, differences exist between macro data
on countries and micro data on households, as: i) the former typically include
the entire population, while the latter constitute a sample to make inference on,
with consequences in terms of selection bias and representativeness; ii) the former
are typically more reliable, both because they originate from official sources and
because they benefit from a sort of “convexification” due to aggregation, whereas
the latter may be marred by measurement errors, especially in income variation;
iii) data at country level are typically influenced by fewer variables than data at
the household (or individual) level. Thus economic relations at lower aggregation
levels can be identified only subject to more controls (demographic, geographic,
economic, family-linked) than at higher aggregation levels. These difficulties may
3As mentioned above, many seminal studies on risksharing - which explicitly or implicitly
only took into account portfolio diversification - aimed at testing full risksharing, without paying
attention to its quantification.
4As mentioned above, many seminal studies on risksharing - which explicitly or implicitly
only took into account portfolio diversification - aimed at testing full risksharing, without paying
attention to its quantification.
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partly explain the relative scarcity of studies on risksharing channels at the micro
level in the last 20 years.5
This paper takes on the task of identifying and measuring household riskshar-
ing channels, and addresses the issues outlined above in several ways. First, by
focusing on the household head’s income, rather than on the household income,
we mitigate endogeneity arising from the joint determination of consumption and
hours of work (Dynarski and Gruber 1997) or other household-specific unobserv-
able characteristics. Second, by testing regressions with prime-age household
heads, we can avoid issues arising from life-cycle/permanent-income intertempo-
ral choices, and focus on cross-sectional (i.e. risksharing) aspects. Third, we
address the issue of measurement errors - which is particularly serious in survey
microdata 6 - both in the independent variables (by using IV estimations), and
in the dependent variables (by offsetting the increased standard error through ac-
curate sample selection). Fourth, by adopting a specification based on household
(head)’s income as a regressor (instead of aggregate income), we can more easily
address the influence of taste shocks on the risksharing metric.7
Our reliance on SHIW data presents advantages which have been rarely exploited
by the risksharing literature. Indeed, unlike the PSID - which only collects con-
sumption data on food and housing, and not every year - SHIW surveys collect
data on all consumption items on a biannual frequency, providing us with a more
complete view of total consumption expenditure. In addition, by using true pan-
els of households over couples of consecutive waves and using first differences, we
reduce issues of attrition and avoid the inefficiencies of unbalanced data plaguing
most previous analyses. Furthermore, unlike CEX data, observations on con-
sumption and incomes in SHIW are collected for coincident periods. As Dynarski
and Gruber (1997) point out, the availability of US representative consumption
data only in the PSID and CEX surveys has forced researchers to merge them
with income data at a higher level of aggregation;8 but the resulting averaging out
5The only two articles we have found that attempt to measure household risksharing channels
are Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and Park and Shin (2010)[59]. The former tries to measure
the extent of risksharing mechanisms in the US, but without embedding them in a unified,
internally consistent and theoretically based framework; as a consequence it is not clear that
the various mechanisms identified in the analysis are complementary and their measures do
not overlap. The latter uses a mere transposition of ASY to study Korean households, but
without duly controlling for demographic and economic characteristics of the household. As for
Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996), the article only deals with two broad channels (risksharing
between and within households), does not quantify them (as it only tests for full risksharing)
and estimates them separately, with the risk of overlaps.
6See Nelson (1994).
7See Sørensen and Yosha (1998).
8See for example Attanasio and Davis (1996).
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of individual earnings variation has been detrimental for risksharing estimations,
which are based precisely on those variations. Using our framework, we obtain
results shedding light on household risksharing behavior under several dimensions.
First, we find that Italian households were able to smooth at least 78% of shocks
to household head’s non-financial income in 2008-2010, a fraction rising to 80% in
2010-2012. Second, perhaps surprisingly, the most important, smoothing mecha-
nism turns out to be within-household risksharing, which is able to absorb 38% of
the shock in 2008-2010, and 40% in 2010-2012. Self-insurance is also notable, as
it cushioned 28% of changes in basic income in 2008-2010, and 24% in 2010-2012.
Informal risk sharing is particularly sizeable in the second spell of the recession
when it amounts to 7.5%. Capital income risksharing plays an extremely limited
role, as it only reaches significance in 2010-2012, with a meager 2.4% of a shock
absorbed; this result is not totally surprising, given the often limited degree of
financial depth uncovered in studies on Italian household portfolios as well as the
well-known problem of under-reporting of financial assets in the surveys with the
SHIW not being an exception (D’Aurizio et al. 2006)[23]. While private riskshar-
ing buffers 70% of a shock (74% in 2010-2012), public risksharing only cushions
about 7% of a shock in both spells, with taxes smoothing more than transfers.
A breakdown by household head’s net wealth quintiles shows a striking disparity
in household ability to smooth shocks to household heads’ non-financial income.
In the 2008-2010 biennium, households with the poorest 40% of heads could only
smooth 67% of shocks, and 78% in the third quintile; however, in the fourth and
fifth quintiles households are able to buffer a whopping 93% of a shock, coming
close to full risksharing. In the next biennium, the degree of risksharing increases
in all net wealth classes, passing from 70% to 83%, to 95% and finally to a full
100% for the richest quintile of household heads.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the methodology to estimate
channels of risk sharing within and between households. Section 3 presents the
data. Section 4 illustrates the empirical implementation to quantify risksharing
channels. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1. Conceptual framework
This section provides the theoretical foundations of the risksharing mechanisms
that help smooth household consumption by absorbing shocks to the household
heads’ non-financial income (see Dynarski and Gruber 1997).
Consider a stochastic endowment economy, populated by N infinitely-lived house-
holds exhibiting time-separable Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) expected util-
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ity functions over a single consumption good.9 Uncertainty is represented by a
state variable st which summarizes the history up to time t and the trajectory to
infinity and can take on countably many values at any date t. The Pareto-optimal
consumption allocations can be derived by solving the planning problem of maxi-
mizing the weighted sum of individual household utilities subject to the feasibility
constraint that in each state of nature the sum of household consumptions cannot
exceed the sum of all household head’s endowments. Following standard treat-
ments, such as Cochrane (1991), the first order conditions for all st look like:
(ρj)λjUc(C
j
t , δ
j
t ) = µt, j = 1, ..., J (1)
where ρj is household j′s factor of time preference, λj its Pareto weight, δj
its taste shifter and µt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility
constraint, divided by the probability of st. The importance of this condition
is that it already shows how at the optimum, households’ marginal utility is
independent of individual household (head)’s endowment. Dividing the expression
(1) at two successive dates can get rid of the time-invariant Pareto weight, yielding:
ρj
Uc(C
j
t+1, δ
j
t+1)
Uc(C
j
t , δ
j
t )
=
µt+1
µt
, j = 1, ..., J. (2)
The discounted growth of marginal utility is the same across households and, given
aggregate consumption, is independent of individual household (head)’s endow-
ments. The consequences for household consumption growth can be illustrated
specifying a CRRA utility function. In this case,
log (
Cjt+1
Cjt
) =
1
γj
[log (
µt+1
µt
)− log (b
j
t+1
bjt
)− log (ρj)] (3)
where γj is household j′s risk aversion coefficient and bjt is a multiplicative taste
shock. The planner’s optimal risksharing solution thus prescribes that household
consumption growth - net of preference variation [log (bjt+1/b
j
t), γ
j, ρj] and given
aggregate consumption growth represented by log (µjt+1/µ
j
t) - must be independent
of idiosyncratic household variables, notably household (head)’s endowment.10
9Generalization to a production economy (Cochrane 1991) and to a multicommodity envi-
ronment (Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff 1996) is immediate.
10As shown by Cochrane (1991) this result can be generalized to other utility functions, even
non-separable in leisure. More precisely, the utility function may assume any form (provided it
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The diametrically opposite case emerges when the planner cannot shift the con-
sumption good between households; in this case, idiosyncratic risk cannot be
shared and the trivial solution is for the household to simply consume the house-
hold head’s endowment W , so that:
log (
Cjt+1
Cjt
) = log (
W jt+1
W jt
) (4)
The optimal planner solution can be decentralized and implemented, in full or
in part, through several mechanisms, depending on the financial and institu-
tional structure of the economy. For example, the existence of complete markets
of Arrow-Debreu contingent claims (Arrow, 1964), or a specific set of securities
(Duffie and Huang, 1985[30]), allows households to implement the full risksharing
solution through asset diversification. Such optimal allocation can also be attained
in a bonds-only economy, provided that the endowment shocks are all transitory
(Baxter and Crucini, 1995[9]; Levine and Zame, 2002[52]; Willen, 1999[71]). Sim-
ilarly, the existence of appropriate government tax/transfers mechanisms allows
subsidizing, at least partially, households whose head’s non-financial income has
been hit by a negative shock, drawing from incomes hit by a positive shock. In
addition, risksharing can be provided through self insurance, that is by asset ac-
cumlation (saving) and depletion (dissaving) through lending and borrowing. A
peculiar type of saving is represented by the timely purchase of durables, which
may constitute an additional channel of self insurance. Furthermore, informal
risksharing can take place, especially in developing economies, through private
gifts, transfers, aid or services. Finally, partial risksharing can be attained if the
household head’s non-financial income can be pooled with the income of other
household members. Unlike some previous work, we maintain a very general
setup by not assuming any particular financial or institutional structure for our
economy, and let the empirical analysis reveal whether the extent of risksharing
in our sample is full, partial or nil. We also refrain from modelling endogenous
frictions leading to market imperfections (such as limited commitment or enforce-
ability). In fact, the stylized facts and statistical linkages that we uncover will
help shed some light precisely on the most appropriate financial and institutional
structure or endogenous market imperfections characterizing the Italian economy
in the period under exam.
is concave and monotonic), may not be time-separable, may not be a VNM function; in addition,
arbitrary shocks may be included.
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2.2. Empirical Model of Risk Sharing Channels
If risk is fully shared through market or non-market institutions, household con-
sumption should not respond to idiosyncratic shocks to household head’s non-
financial income. As in Cochrane (1991) and Dynarski and Gruber (1997), we
operationalize this notion by analyzing the regression coefficient of household con-
sumption change on the change in household head’s non-financial income:
log (
Cjt+1
Cjt
) = α + β log (
W jt+1
W jt
) + ujt (5)
where the disturbance may include a measurement error. Here the α inter-
cept captures the effect on consumption variation of aggregate variables, notably
aggregate consumption or aggregate income.11 It is useful to keep in mind that
autarky implies that the β coefficient is equal to one. On the other hand, if in-
surance markets are perfect, then this coefficient should be zero.12 Intermediate
values can then be interpreted as measuring the degree of risksharing. As pointed
out by Dynarski and Gruber (1997) and Fafchamps (2011), the β coefficient cap-
tures the extent to which the household manages to smooth consumption in the
face of the head’s non-financial income shocks. In other words,
1− β = Cov(∆logC
j,∆logW j)
Var(∆logW j)
(6)
is an appropriate measure of the extent of household consumption smoothing
via risksharing. The main contribution of the risksharing channels methodology
consists in a decomposition of the overall risksharing measure 1 − β into the
smoothing contributions of the different risksharing mechanisms mentioned above.
For every household, we reconstruct the following variables:
• Basic income (household head’s wage income + autonomous income + pen-
sions): W
• Non-financial income (household’s basic income): H
• Total income (i.e., non-financial income + capital income from real estate
and financial assets + end-of-service gratuities): Y
11In some specifications of the risksharing model, the term log (µjt+1/µ
j
t ) is specified as ag-
gregate consumption growth (e.g. Mace 1991), and at times it is added as a regressor to the
income growth measure (eg Obstfeld 1994). However, in a cross-section the aggregate term is
replaced by the constant term.
12See Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008).
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• Gross income (total income + public transfers received13): Y G
• Disposable income (gross income - taxes paid14): Y D
• Total disposable income (disposable income + inter-and-intra-generational
(private) transfers15): Y T
• Total consumption expenditure (total disposable income - savings): C
• Non-durable consumption: (total consumption expenditure - durable con-
sumption expenditure): Cn
The econometric model is based on the idea that, if two successive income
measures do not co-move, the smoothing mechanism represented by their differ-
ence is at work. For instance, to the extent that H and Y do not co-move, it
means that financial income flows have provided a smoothing effect. By the same
token, to the extent that Y G and Y D do not co-move, it means that taxes have
provided further smoothing. Take the following identity for every household j:
W j =
W j
Hj
Hj
Y j
Y j
Y Gj
Y Gj
Y Dj
Y Dj
Y T j
Y T j
Cj
Cj
Cnj
(7)
After taking logs and first differences,
∆wj = (∆wj−∆hj)+(∆hj−∆yj)+...+(∆ytj−∆cj)+(∆cj−∆cnj)+∆cnj (8)
where lowercase letters indicate logs.
Multiplying both sides by ∆wj and taking expectations, and then dividing through
by Var(∆wj), we obtain a constrained sum of simple regression coefficients:
1 =
Cov(∆wj,∆wj −∆hj)
Var(∆wj)
+...+
Cov(∆wj,∆ytj −∆cj)
Var(∆wj)
+
Cov(∆wj,∆cj −∆cnj)
Var(∆wj)
(9)
or
1− β = βH + βK + βTr + βTax + βI + βS + βDC (10)
13They include unemployment benefits, mobility allowances and various forms of social assis-
tance payments (such as attendance and disability living allowance) which are directly surveyed
in the SHIW plus family allowances (ANF) which are simulated (see footnote 17).
14See footnote 17.
15These include gifts and transfers from (non-cohabitant) relatives and friends and main-
tenance payments. Apart from the latter item this variable is conceivable as adding to YD
informal transfers between households.
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The overall risksharing measure 1 − β is decomposed into 7 coefficients. The
first coefficient on the RHS - βH - measures the percentage of basic income changes
that is smoothed within the household; the second - βK - the percentage of basic
income changes that is further smoothed by capital incomes; the third and the
fourth - βTr - and - βTax - the further smoothing provided by taxes and transfers,
respectively; the fifth - βI - represents the share that is further smoothed by infor-
mal transfers between households; then βS is the amount of smoothing provided
by saving and dis-saving. Finally, βDC represents possible smoothing provided by
a variation in durable expenditures.
The next section will detail the econometric methodology we use to gauge these
coefficients as correctly as possible, addressing the estimation issues arising from
our setup.
3. Data
Our analysis of household risk sharing uses the panel component of biannual data
from the Bank of Italy’s SHIW, for the periods 2008-2010 and 2010-2012. The
main objective of the SHIW is to study the economic behavior of Italian house-
holds, defined as groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption
and sharing the same dwelling. The sample size comprises about 8000 house-
holds per year selected from population registers and the survey contains a sizable
panel component which allows econometricians to estimate target variables’ pro-
cesses and transitions. The longitudinal component allows us to follow over 50%
of the households in two spells of twice-repeated observations.16Data collection
is entrusted to a specialized company using professional interviewers and CAPI
methodology. The survey collects the following information:
• characteristics of the household and of its members (number of income earn-
ers, gender, age, education, job status, industry sector, and characteristics
of the dwelling);
• income (wage and salaries, income from self-employment, pensions and other
financial transfers, income from financial assets and real estate);
• consumption and saving (food consumption, other nondurables, expenses
for housing, health, insurance, spending on durable goods, and household
16In the panel component, the sampling procedure is determined in two stages: (i) selection
of municipalities (among those sampled in the previous survey); (ii) selection of households to
re-interview. This implies that there is a fixed component in the panel (for instance, households
interviewed 10 times between 1994 and 2012, or 4 times from 2006 to 2012) and a new component
every survey (for instance, households interviewed only in 2012).
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saving);
• wealth in terms of real estate, financial assets, liabilities;
• special modules such as capital gains, inheritance, risk aversion, unpaid
work, economic mobility, social capital, tax evasion, financial literacy.
From these items, we reconstructed households’ balance sheets, income state-
ments, statements of cash flows and consolidated financial statements, along the
lines suggested by Samphantharak and Townsend (2006)Furthermore, since the
data does not allow constructing household members’ gross incomes, we proceeded
to reconstruct gross incomes using an imputation methodology - through EGaLiTe
tax&benefit MSM simulations17 - to recover gross figures for basic income and dis-
entangle household allowances from disposable income.
Our variables are measured as reported in 2.2, and are all in nominal terms. The
precise definition for the rate of variation is that reported footnote 18 (section 4)
For Italy, Padula (2004) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006)[44], 2010[45],2011[46]),
employ the SHIW data to study the joint dynamics of household income and con-
sumption.
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics summarizing the distribution of key vari-
ables used in the estimate for the two subperiods. In particular, the first two-year
of crisis (2008-2010) is characterized by a marked average fall in household heads
basic income (∆wj, -7.5%), with a distribution, negatively skewed, with median
equal to 2% and standard deviation of 57%. However, in the same spell nominal
nondurable consumption rate of growth (∆cnj) is positive both for the average
and for the median household (5.6% and 4.9%, respectively), while a contraction
in durable consumption (∆dcj) appears. In the second spell (2010-2012), basic
income average rate of growth is roughly zero, while the median household head
17EGaLiTe (see for other applications Gastaldi et al., 2014[35]) uses a standard iterative
method to simulate net-to-gross personal income trajectories. In particular the fiscal module
simulates the personal income taxation (PIT) progressive structure, including its regional/local
surtaxes and the main tax expenditures. Moreover, it approximates the distribution of family
allowances (Assegno al Nucleo Familiare) which represent the main subsidy for households with
dependent children in Italy but - unfortunately - cannot be directly disentangled from the labor
income information reported in the survey. Finally, the fiscal module simulates the tax impact of
owner-occupied dwellings (whose imputed rent is fully deductible from the PIT tax base in the
period 2008-2010) which in the second spell is embodied in the new property tax “IMU”. This
latter tax-payment for 2012 is self-reported by respondents in the survey. Since a micro analysis
of tax evasion behavior is beyond the scope of this study, we adopt the simplifying assumption
of no tax evasion in earnings. This can be easily accepted for employees while bringing lower
accuracy in reconstructing gross figures for the self-employed. The loss of accuracy is however
mitigated by the fact that we work with changes in variables, and tax evasion in Italy does not
tend to vary much over time.
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experiences a negative variation (-0.8%) in the same variable. Nondurable con-
sumption, in this two-years period, grows both in mean and in median (at a rate
of almost 10%) while a pretty large contraction characterizes durable expenditure
(-26% and -59% mean and median values, respectively).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
spell mean 50% Std. Dev.
∆wj 2008-10 -7.46% 2.11% 56.70%
2010-12 0.04% -0.83% 73.19%
∆cnj 2008-10 5.57% 4.88% 34.32%
2010-12 9.62% 9.52% 38.61%
∆dcj 2008-10 -2.92% -6.90% 170.98%
2010-12 -26.30% -58.82% 171.59%
Sources: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008-10-12 (panel component for consecutive
waves)
4. Estimation
At the empirical level, our baseline estimation model implementing the identity
above is the following cross-sectional SUR:
∆wj −∆hj = νH + βH∆wj + εjH
∆hj −∆yj = νK + βK∆wj + εjK
∆yj −∆ygj = νTr + βTr∆wj + εjTr
∆ygj −∆ydj = νTax + βTax∆wj + εjTax
∆ydj −∆ytj = νI + βI∆wj + εjI
∆ytj −∆cj = νS + βS∆wj + εjS
∆cj −∆cnj = νDC + βDC∆wj + εjDC
(11)
where the ν. intercepts capture the effect on the dependent variables of ag-
gregate changes. The SUR estimation accounts for the likely cross-equation error
correlations, in view of the symmetric structure of our problem.18
18This baseline SUR estimation is similar to Park and Shin (2010). Likewise, to deal with
possible zeros we redefine percentage variations as d.Y jt =
Y jt −Y jt−1
(Y jt +Y
j
t−1)/2
where Y is a generic
variable.
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Before estimating the SUR in 11 one can separately estimate the following single
equation which is linearly dependent:
∆cnj = ν + β∆wj + εj (12)
Note that from equations 11, the sum of the β. coefficients equals 1− β, that
is the coefficient of the equation 12. Hence, to estimate the overall degree of
risksharing we may as well estimate this coefficient. Starting from this baseline
estimation, other augmented estimations are performed, in order to address po-
tential econometric issues.
4.1. Household characteristics and life-cycle behavior
Household-level data are subject to numerous influences, which are typically con-
trolled for using an additional set of demographic and economic variables, so that
equation 13 above becomes:
log (
Cnjt+1
Cnjt
) = α + β log (
W jt+1
W jt
) + γ′ logXjt + u
j
t (13)
where Xjt is a vector including standard controls, as suggested in most research
on the topic.19
Consequently, the SUR system in (11) is also estimated using additional covari-
ates in each equation. One of these controls is of particular interest: a measure of
household head’s net wealth interacted with household head’s basic income varia-
tion. Not only will the wealth variable control for size effects in consumption, but,
more importantly, it will also ensure that influences on consumption stemming
from life-cycle behavior are mitigated.20An additional covariate is the variation
in household components which controls for changes in the household economies
of scale and for taste shocks due to changes in the household structure. In our
preferred estimation the augmented SUR system is run on a restricted sample of
households with prime-age household heads (aged 30-55); this mitigates concerns
related to life-cycle choices, such as moving from student to worker or deciding
retirement. Finally, a measure of the individual expectation for the future replace-
ment rate achievable with the public pension is used in our preferred estimation,
in order to purge the beta coefficient from effects linked to retirement decisions
and public pensions.
19See Mace (1991) or Dynarski and Gruber (1997).
20Controls for demographic and household characteristics also contribute to minimize the
effect of life-cycle behavior.
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4.2. Measurement errors, preference shocks, omitted vari-
ables bias, and endogeneity
Because of the survey characteristics (e.g., response bias), and the imputation
exercise we carried out to recover gross incomes, our data - and particularly ba-
sic incomes- may be subject to measurement errors. This problem is only par-
tially mitigated by the accurate surveying methodology applied in sampling SHIW
households and by our use of changes in variables. As is well known, such (clas-
sical) measurement error boils down to an endogeneity bias stemming from the
basic income variable. Addressing this bias also corrects the inefficiency associ-
ated to the coefficient’s standard error.
A second source of endogeneity bias is the potential correlation between the ba-
sic basic income change measure and the household preference variation (taste
shifter, risk aversion coefficient and rate of time preference) as well as the leisure
measure in case of non-separability of the utility function (see Cochrane 1991).
The former problem is partially addressed by adding demographic and household
characteristics; the latter problem is addressed in part by using household head’s
basic income as a regressor (as opposed to household basic income), in part by
including a measure of aggregate leisure, which in our cross-sections amounts to
adding an intercept in the regressions.
A third source of endogeneity bias is potential omitted variables bias, to the ex-
tent the explanatory variables indicated by consumption theory and econometric
practice (which we have included) capture some effect of other variables lumped
in the error term.
In our final specification, we address all these endogeneity problems by running
IV regressions, with instruments which are plausibly exogenous to consumption
and correlated with household head’s basic income, like a sudden unemployment
spell in the arrival year, or a particular sector in the starting year (e.g. agricul-
tural sector or public sector). Note that the use of these instruments can address
simultaneously all the sources of endogeneity mentioned above.21 Even in the case
the measurement error in the original variable is correlated with the measurement
error of the instrument, such correlation will likely disappear with the time differ-
encing we adopt. For example, if a household head always underreports her basic
income, the effect will wash out when taking first differences.22
21In the case of residual correlation between non-separable leisure and job loss, we use the
alternative instrument (sector).
22See Dynarski and Gruber (1997).
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4.3. Nonlinearities
An important source of potential bias might be nonlinearities in the determina-
tion of consumption, such as the existence of liquidity constraints. As Dynarski
and Gruber (1997) point out, consumption changes may not respond to small and
frequent variations in the head’s earnings, but it may well suffer from large, low-
frequency changes (such as an unemployment spell). Hence, our use of unemploy-
ment spells as instruments may reveal the existence of such liquidity constrained
(or simply rule-of-thumb, myopic) behavior. We also try to mitigate issues related
to liquidity constraints by focusing on household heads with positive basic income
in the start year.
4.4. Sample selection bias
We need to ensure that the probability of a household-year being included in the
sample depends only on the exogenous variables and the permanent component of
the error term.23 The response bias and sample selection bias stemming from the
administration of the survey have been thoroughly addressed in several papers by
the Bank of Italy, which provide the weights necessary to recalibrate the sample
variables to make them representative of population variables.
4.5. Attrition
We address issues of attrition - arising from the unavoidable changes of the sample
over time (due to births, deaths, marriages, divorces, new sample units arriving,
old sample units dropping) - by limiting our scope to a true panel of households;
thus, our cross-sections contain the same households followed across the entire
sample period. As for changes within the same household, we control for the
number and age of components.
4.6. Outliers
Similarly to differenced logarithms, our formulation in terms of percentage varia-
tions with reference to the mean (see footnote 18) is able to significantly reduce
the influence of outliers: indeed, in our preferred estimation subsample , they
are limited to one severe case only for the dependent variable in the first spell of
variation that we drop from the sample itself.
23As pointed out by Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996), this assumption is made, often
implicitly, in virtually all panel data studies on consumption.
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5. Results
It is worth recalling, also for comparison purposes, that the variable whose vari-
ance we are breaking down is the change in household head’s basic income, and
thus all the results we discuss have to be referred to that variable.
5.1. Overall risksharing
Table 2 illustrates the results for 2008-2010 and 2010-2012 of our baseline specifi-
cation (column 1), the augmented specification (column 2) and the IV estimation
(column 3) for nondurable consumption changes (i.e. the equation (12)) over
the baseline sample characterized by household heads aged 30-55 with a positive
initial basic income.
Our preferred estimation (IV in column 3) shows that Italian households were
able to smooth at least 78% of a shock to the household head’s basic income
changes in 2008-2010, a fraction rising to 80% in 2010-2012. Remarkably, these
coefficients are much lower in the baseline and augmented specifications, suggest-
ing that our strategy of adopting a series of controls and instruments to isolate
the pure relation between household head’s basic income changes and household
consumption changes is vindicated. Furthermore, our tests on the instruments
adopted 24reveal their fitness by means of an F test of excluded instruments al-
ways well above the conventional measure of 10. Moreover, since the IV model is
over-identified, we can test the instruments’ validity with the Hansen J statistic.
In both spells we cannot reject the null that the instruments satisfy the required
orthogonality conditions.
Despite differences between the various specifications, the qualitative conclusions
carry over across all estimations: household risksharing in Italy can smooth at
least three quarters of a shock to the head’s basic income. This result is consistent
with most studies on risksharing in Italy, both at the micro and macro level: for
example, at the macro level, Scorcu (1997)[67] and Cellini and Scorcu (2002)[19]
for 1971-1993, Pellegrini (1997)[60] and Dedola, Usai and Vannini (1999)[28] for
1983-1992, Me´litz and Zumer (1999)[54] for 1984-1992, Gardini, Cavaliere and
Fanelli (2005)[34] for 1960-1995, and Cavaliere, Fanelli and Gardini (2006)[18] for
1960-2001 all find a notable and significant degree of smoothing among Italian re-
gions; at the micro level Krueger and Perri (2011)[50] for 1987-2008 reach results
24In the first spell of variation we use as instruments the transition from employment to
unemployment and working in the public sector in the starting year (2008); in the second spell,
the transition to unemployment and working in the farming sector in the starting year (2010).
Workers of both sectors enjoy a particular treatment due to direct job protection or indirect
sector subsidization
17
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on the overall degree of risksharing which are extremely similar to ours.
5.2. Risksharing channels
How this overall smoothing breaks down across the 7 channels of risksharing we
have identified is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Risksharing channels
2008-10 2010-12 2008-10 2010-12 2008-10 2010-12
SUR=OLS SUR (constrained) SUR (constrained)
Channels
1. Base income from other members
[βH ] ∆(base income hh) 0.340*** 0.405*** 0.423*** 0.516*** 0.390*** 0.413***
’(0.0153) ’(0.0147) ’(0.0167) ’(0.0174) ’(0.0163) ’(0.0165)
i ∆income*wealth 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.037*** 0.014***
’(0.0047) ’(0.0047) ’(0.0044) ’(0.0041)
Northwest 0.007 0.071***
’(0.0146) ’(0.0209)
∆housemembers -0.220*** -0.124***
’(0.0313) ’(0.0306)
Constant -0.027*** 0.018* -0.026*** 0.005 -0.026*** 0.023**
’(0.0087) ’(0.0107) ’(0.0093) ’(0.0126) ’(0.0084) ’(0.0107)
2. Capital incomes (financial and real)
[βK ] ∆(base income hh) -0.003 0.007 0.021*** 0.031*** 0 0.024***
’(0.0063) ’(0.0051) ’(0.0064) ’(0.0066) ’(0.0069) ’(0.0058)
i ∆income*wealth 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.010***
’(0.0018) ’(0.0018) ’(0.0019) ’(0.0014)
Northwest 0.003 -0.027***
’(0.0070) ’(0.0103)
Constant -0.007* -0.011*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.007** -0.011***
’(0.0036) ’(0.0037) ’(0.0037) ’(0.0049) ’(0.0036) ’(0.0037)
3. Public transfers other than pensions
[βTr] ∆(base income hh) 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.033***
’(0.0050) ’(0.0061) ’(0.0044) ’(0.0059) ’(0.0051) ’(0.0068)
i ∆income*wealth -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.022*** -0.016***
’(0.0012) ’(0.0016) ’(0.0014) ’(0.0017)
∆housemembers -0.041*** -0.031** -0.037*** -0.007
’(0.0107) ’(0.0151) ’(0.0126) ’(0.0154)
Constant -0.006** 0.002 -0.003 -0.008** -0.004 0.001
’(0.0029) ’(0.0045) ’(0.0022) ’(0.0040) ’(0.0026) ’(0.0044)
4. PIT & Property tax on OODs
[βTax] ∆(base income hh) 0.044*** 0.023*** 0.058*** 0.024*** 0.047*** 0.029***
’(0.0029) ’(0.0024) ’(0.0033) ’(0.0029) ’(0.0033) ’(0.0028)
i ∆income*wealth 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.002***
’(0.0009) ’(0.0008) ’(0.0009) ’(0.0007)
∆housemembers -0.025*** -0.031***
’(0.0069) ’(0.0076)
hh got-in-unemployment 0.059*** 0.045***
’(0.0108) ’(0.0112)
Constant 0.008*** 0.002 0.007*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.002
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’(0.0017) ’(0.0018) ’(0.0016) ’(0.0019) ’(0.0017) ’(0.0018)
5. Informal transfers
[βI ] ∆(base income hh) 0.045*** 0.080*** 0.012** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.074***
’(0.0056) ’(0.0073) ’(0.0052) ’(0.0075) ’(0.0062) ’(0.0085)
i ∆income*wealth -0.003** -0.007*** -0.003** -0.002
’(0.0014) ’(0.0019) ’(0.0017) ’(0.0021)
∆housemembers -0.053*** -0.004
’(0.0121) ’(0.0203)
hh got-in-unemployment -0.082*** -0.112***
’(0.0190) ’(0.0298)
south 0.009 -0.020*
’(0.0059) ’(0.0105)
tenant-occupied dwelling 0.006
’(0.0069)
Constant 0 -0.018*** 0 -0.003 -0.002 -0.018***
’(0.0032) ’(0.0054) ’(0.0027) ’(0.0054) ’(0.0037) ’(0.0054)
6. Saving/dissaving
[βS ] ∆(base income hh) 0.377*** 0.323*** 0.331*** 0.273*** 0.301*** 0.233***
’(0.0237) ’(0.0171) ’(0.0246) ’(0.0198) ’(0.0231) ’(0.0178)
i ∆income*wealth -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005
’(0.0062) ’(0.0049) ’(0.0071) ’(0.0048)
∆housemembers -0.083* -0.176***
’(0.0461) ’(0.0447)
hh got-in-unemployment 0.184** 0.202***
’(0.0794) ’(0.0706)
tenant-occupied dwelling 0.014 0.100*** -0.050* 0.110***
’(0.0207) ’(0.0237) ’(0.0263) ’(0.0252)
ERR -0.011 -0.067 -0.118** -0.024
’(0.0622) ’(0.0512) ’(0.0523) ’(0.0456)
i ∆income*ERR -0.108 -0.072 -0.145*** -0.173***
’(0.0673) ’(0.0436) ’(0.0478) ’(0.0392)
Constant -0.012 -0.060*** -0.002 -0.028 0.074** -0.068**
’(0.0135) ’(0.0125) ’(0.0411) ’(0.0325) ’(0.0364) ’(0.0298)
7. Durable expenditures
[βDC ] ∆(base income hh) -0.005 0.008 0.02 0.022* -0.017 -0.002
’(0.0142) ’(0.0090) ’(0.0184) ’(0.0123) ’(0.0156) ’(0.0103)
i ∆income*wealth -0.005 -0.002
’(0.0043) ’(0.0025)
tenant-occupied dwelling 0.060*** 0.005
’(0.0181) ’(0.0153)
Constant -0.022*** -0.037*** -0.005 -0.048*** -0.038*** -0.038***
’(0.0081) ’(0.0066) ’(0.0273) ’(0.0180) ’(0.0094) ’(0.0076)
R-squared eq.1 0.283 0.362 0.339 0.414 0.328 0.367
R-squared eq.2 0 0.001 0.009 0.029 0.002 0.037
R-squared eq.3 0.099 0.087 0.127 0.042 0.255 0.146
R-squared eq.4 0.152 0.061 0.208 0.067 0.153 0.067
R-squared eq.5 0.048 0.081 0.054 0.099 0.051 0.081
R-squared eq.6 0.167 0.21 0.134 0.153 0.155 0.187
N. of cases 1260 1344 1260 1344 1260 1344
Sources: Bank of Italy SHIW 2008-10-12 (panel component for consecutive waves)
The table reveals that the most important smoothing mechanism is within-
household risksharing (βH), which is able to absorb 39% of the shock in 2008-
2010, and almost 41% in 2010-2012. This result is in contrast with the findings
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on the PSID in Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996)[41] and on both the PSID
and the CEX in Dynarski and Gruber (1997)[31] - who find nonsignificant effects
of non-head income - but parallels the results on the PSID in Garc´ıa-Escribano
(2004)[33] - who uses an ASY (1996)-style measure of smoothing. Our result
reflects Mocetti, Olivieri and Viviano (2011)’s[55] finding that the effects of the
economic crisis on the Italian labour market have been partly absorbed within
the households, thanks to i) the greater diffusion of large households (the more
adults present the lower the risk of joblessness) and ii) the greater propensity to
link household formation to employment status.
Self-insurance (βS) is also quite large, as it cushions, on average, 30% of changes
in basic income shocks in 2008-2010, and 23% in 2010-2012. In order to disentan-
gle the role of life-cycle/pension motives from precautionary savings the equation
for this channel is augmented with a measure of the individual expectation for
the future replacement rate achievable with the public pension. This information
is available in the SHIW for the whole sample of active individuals. We use this
variable (ERR) both alone and interacted25with household head’s basic income.
Interestingly enough, the elasticity for the interaction is negative (-14% and -17%,
for the first and second spell, respectively) and statistically significant at the 1%
level, revealing a lower shock absorption from savings/dis-savings for those house-
holds whose head has a higher-than-average expectation for her replacement rate.
At a macro level Dedola, Usai and Vannini (1999)[28] find somewhat lower but
still notable results for Italy in 1983-1992.
Capital income risksharing (βK) plays an extremely limited role, as it only reaches
significance in 2010-2012, with a meager 2.4% of shock absorption; this result,
while unknown to the previous literature, is not really surprising, given the often
limited degree of financial depth uncovered in studies on Italian household port-
folios as well as the well-known problem of under-reporting of financial assets in
the surveys, SHIW not being an exception (D’Aurizio et al. 2006).26 A similar
argument holds for net wealth which, if anything, exerts a negligible effect on con-
sumption smoothing, at least when interacted with basic income, with the only
exception of the first, within-household channel, where its interaction is slightly
positive.27 To these formal channels we can add the informal one - consisting in
private transfers between households (βI) - that seems to be particularly sizeable
in the second spell of the recession when it almost doubles to 7.4% of a shock.
While private risksharing channels buffer about 70% of a shock (73% in 2010-
2012), public risksharing only cushions between 6% and 7% of a shock, with
25ERR interacted is centered on its year specific mean
26See Guiso and Jappelli (2000)[39].
27This is consistent with a study by Paiella (2007)[] on the effect of wealth on consumption
in the SHIW.
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taxes28smoothing more than transfers in the first period.29However, it is worth
noting that the tax channel excludes risksharing through tax evasion - a phe-
nomenon which is particularly widespread in Italy and which we could not take
into account in the reconstruction of basic incomes (see footnote 17)30.
At a macro level, in Italy Decressin (2002) finds very similar results and
Dedola, Usai and Vannini (1999) even higher coefficients for 1983-1992, whereas
Me´litz and Zumer (1999) find the public risksharing channel to be insignificant
for 1984-1992.
Finally, the adjustment of durable expenditure seems to exert a slight dismooth-
ing effect that, however, is statistically non-significant. Our results on a sample
of all household heads are extremely similar to the above, though some estimates
feature a lower statistical significance, indicating that, once self-insurance has
been accounted for, life-cycle considerations are not particularly important for
our baseline sample.
By comparing results in estimations with or without instruments, we observe
that the measured overall degree of risksharing drops by about 12%; this is an
indication that previous studies that did not control strictly for endogeneity or
nonlinearities tended to overstate the total degree of risksharing, thus possibly ac-
cepting the full risksharing null instead of rejecting it. In particular, the significant
drop in risksharing when basic income is instrumented with unemployment spells
suggests that liquidity constraints are likely a non-negligible source of departure
from optimal consumption behavior.
28It is worth to say the gross incomes are - almost entirely - deterministic functions of net
incomes. Therefore we do not adjust the standard errors for simulation variation
29Asymmetry with respect to positive and negative shocks should be carefully considered, (as
in Dynarski and Gruber 1997), in order to better assess the role of the tax smoothing channel as
a risk sharing device. It turns out, in fact, that taxation as an automatic smoothing device works
much better with positive than with negative shocks, actually exhibiting some quite nonlinear
dynamics. This is most likely the reason why the corresponding equation does not pass the
usual tests of exogeneity. However, instrumenting household head’s basic income changes does
not solve the problem, for it overplays negative shocks vs. positive ones, and results in a much
lower significance of the corresponding coefficient. We have chosen, therefore, to stick to our
preferred estimation in this case, too.
30The biggest discrepancy between our measure of tax risksharing and the actual tax riskshar-
ing including tax evasion risksharing arises in the case the interviewed household head lies on
the growth of her gross income (to the tax authorities) but not on the growth of her net income
(to SHIW interviewers). In this case the tax risksharing that we measure is presumably smaller
than the tax risksharing illicitly attained by the household.
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5.3. Further decompositions: the role of wealth
The SHIW presents the undisputable advantage of covering a dualistic economy
like Italy, featuring a large degree of variation across regions, socio-economic strata
and, ultimately, households. Acciari and Mocetti (2013) report that the Gini index
for Italian households is among the highest, both internationally and interregion-
ally, and Brandolini and Torrini (2010) point out that Italy is the sole advanced
country exhibiting such wide territorial differences. Of course, geographic hetero-
geneity is a reflection of household heterogeneity, for example in terms of income
(D’Alessio 2012) and joblessness distribution (Mocetti, Olivieri and Viviano 2011).
Due to this ample variability, the SHIW is suitable to be further explored beyond
the risksharing channels analysis, to uncover the determinants of certain mecha-
nisms through further decompositions of our results.
It is well known that a household consumption response to income shocks may
depend on the household (head)’s wealth, due to permanent income and liquid-
ity constraints considerations. For this reason we introduced an interaction term
of net wealth and basic income as an additional covariate in our second and
third specifications. Yet we can exploit further the wealth variable to break down
risksharing behavior according to the level of the household head’s net wealth. Our
motivation lies on the wealth effects that the literature has postulated on house-
hold risksharing behavior. For example, a major strand of consumption research
has explored the differences between “poor” and “rich” households, postulating
that the former may be less able to access credit and financial markets,31while the
latter may save at higher rates32and invest in riskier assets.33
Tables 4 and 5 illustrates the results of our estimations of overall risksharing (as
in Table 2) by quintiles of household net wealth.
The most important result emerging is the striking disparity in household
(head)’s ability to smooth shocks to basic income, depending on net wealth. In
the 2008-2010 (Table 4) biennium, households with the poorest 40% of heads34
could only smooth 67% of shocks, and 78% in the third quintile; however, in the
fourth and fifth quintiles households are able to buffer a whopping 93% of a shock,
coming close to full risksharing. In the next biennium (Table 5), the degree of
risksharing increases in all net wealth classes, passing from 70% to 83%, to 95%
and finally to a full 100% for the richest quintile of household heads. The constant
term - which captures the dependency of consumption on aggregate variables -
31For example, Campbell and Mankiw (1990) assume that a fraction of households consumes
its current income, due to liquidity constraints or myopic behavior.
32See Carroll (2000), Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (1996), Gentry and Hubbard (1998), Huggett
(1996), Quadrini (1999).
33See Carroll (2000a).
34According to the endogeneity test the IV estimator is required for this subgroup only.
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increases in parallel, thus confirming a better fit of successively richer household
heads behavior with the full risksharing paradigm.
Unsurprisingly, better-off households mainly smooth consumption through pri-
vate risksharing channels. However, interestingly enough, in Italy they appear to
rely heavily on within-household risksharing. This channel, amounting to 49%
and 54% for those in the fourth quintile, in the first and in the second spell
respectively, skyrockets to a striking 77% for households in the top quintile in
the 2010-2012 biennium. For these latter households the weight of this channel
doubles from the first to the second spell. As expected, this channel replaces in
importance self-insurance for richer households.
On the other hand, poorest households smooth a smaller 32% of a shock through
income from other members in both spells, and between 25% and 29% through
self-insurance, overall relying for at least 57% on private risksharing channels.35
These results on the polarization of risksharing, driven by within-household riskshar-
ing, are consistent with models of positive assortative mating (Greenwood et al.
2014), where “marrying your like” generates inequality in household income dis-
tribution.
It may appear that our results of a substantial degree of household risksharing
contradict Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006)’s finding of a significant mobility of log
consumption of SHIW households from 1987 through 1995, which is in conflict
with the implications of full risksharing with a power utility function. In fact,
the opposite is true: apart from obvious differences in the time period and the
estimation methodologies, a changing distribution of consumption is in line both
with our general approach - which allows and corrects for utility functions which
may be neither leisure nor time-separable, nor even VNM functions - and with
our results on risksharing varying by wealth classes. Indeed, as “poor” house-
holds keep failing to attain full insurance, as we illustrated, the distribution of
consumption may well change over time.
6. Conclusions
The literature has long raised the question of the economic mechanisms under-
lying the high degree of risksharing often found in micro data. Indeed, while a
stream of the literature has always implicitly assumed that risksharing is carried
out solely through portfolio diversification, the emergence of the channels litera-
ture has shifted the focus towards the diversity of mechanisms implementing (or
preventing) the planner allocation. This paper, sheds a light on such risksharing
35The detailed results on risksharing channels by net wealth quintiles are available from the
authors upon request.
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mechanisms operating across households. Hence, for example, our results provide
a set of possible mechanisms underlying Krueger and Perri (2011)’s findings in
SHIW data of a low correlation between labor income and consumption, and of a
notable effect of wealth on consumption. Most importantly, our methodology can
be carried over to other settings to investigate household risksharing in countries
where adequate income and consumption data on households is available.
Our finding of a preponderant role played by intra-household risksharing bears
important consequences also for microeconomic modelling. Indeed, as pointed
out by Attanasio and Lechene (2002)[7], the pooling of monetary resources is a
necessary condition of the unitary model of household behavior (but not of more
general models). In the unitary model, household decisions are analyzed under
the hypothesis that the household is a single and monolithic decision unit that
somehow maximizes the welfare of its members. This hypothesis is of great an-
alytical convenience and vastly simplifies the empirical analysis, especially when
data on individual members’ consumption are not measured or even hard to de-
fine. Our finding - which enters a long empirical controversy on the realism of
this hypothesis - lends support to the palatability of the assumption that wel-
fare is equally or optimally distributed within the household. A high degree of
intra-household risksharing also brings about macroeconomic consequences: find-
ings for the US by Halla and Scharler (2012)[40] show that marriages do not just
improve the allocation of risk at the individual level, but also have implications
for the allocation of risk at the more aggregated state level. Finally, in terms of
macro modelling, our results show that the bulk of risksharing takes place either
within the household or through self-insurance, that is simply by using the sim-
plest financial tools available to borrow or lend. This suggests that, in modeling
consumption in economies like Italy, a bonds-only financial structure might be
enough to support the basic patterns of consumption.
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